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Between Price Reform and Privatization:
Eastern Europe in Transition~`
1. Introduction
Several formerly socialist nations in Central and
Eastem Europe have been successful in achieving
currency convertibility and domestic price reform.
In East-Germany, the DM has replaced the Ost-
mark, and prices of goods and services are dictated
by market conditions in the West. Further east,
Bulgaria has set a courageous example by going
almost all the way to currency convertibility and
liberating almost all domestic prices. Poland has
travelled far in the same direction, and Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary and Rumania also are making sub-
stantial progress towards a convertible currency and
a domestic structure of relative prices that reflects
scarcity and costs rather than political considera-
tions.
The progress towards privatization so far appeats
much less impressive. Admittedly, one sees the
establishment of many privately owned small busi-
ness in almost all the formerly socialist countries,
with a predictable emphasis so far on trading com-
panies, followed by retail trade and a variety ofother
commercial services e.g. taxis and restaurants. By
contrast, progress in the privatization of the larger
state-owned enterprises that dominated the econo-
' Revised tezt of a public lecturc given in Sofia on April 4, 1991
at the invitation o( the nulgarian Institute of Management and
Administratinn. t am gr:ucful to ProL Evka Razvigorova-
lanakieva and thc staf( of the institute for thcir hnspitality.
mies of central and eastem Europe seems slow and
hesitant. In this essay 1 try to review some of the
difficulties that have been encountered so far in the
attempts at privatization, and summarize some prin-
ciples that appear to be important at least to this
outside observer.
The principal conclusions of the paper are:
- clarity about property rights has to include
resolution of disputes about taxation, in par-
ticular an end to quarrels between different
units of govemment about the rights to tax.
- to achieve popular capitalism in the sense that
many citizens own a share to a portfolio of large
enterprises is less urgent than an ownership
structure that creates proper incentives for
management and other stakeholders in the finn.
- allowing joint ventures with foreigners creates
large incentives for managers in state enter-
prises to steal at the expense of their companies:
fteedom to deal threatens to become fnxdom to
steal. The basic problem here is that during the
period of transition to privatization, there are
no well defined owners of the enterprise-to-
be-privatized, so that management can act on
the wrong incentives.
- macroeconomic uncertainty scems to be so
pervasive, that it is risky to try to fix the ex-
change rate for long periods.
Tlie next section of the paper continues with a
discussion of some of the lessons to be drawn from
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the experience wi[h market reforms. In sec[ion three
I summarize some modem principles of corporate
finance that seem particularly appropriate for the
privatization of state-owned enterprises in Central
and Eastem Europe. Finally, section four of the
paper is concerned with some macrceconomic is-
sues.
2. Lessons from Poland, the Soviet Union and
East Germany
2.1 Slow privatizativn in Poland
On January lst, 1990 Poland began a program of
macroeconomic stabilization, supported by the In-
temational Monetary Fund (!MF). The Polish Zloty
was fixed at 9,500 Zloty's per U.S. dollar and has
been maintained at the level until the time ofwriting
(May 1991). Also, most prices were libera[ed, and
many govemment subsidies were abolished in order
to reduce the def-icit of the Polish govemment. For
reasons to be discussed below, these financial re-
fortns were not accompanied by substantial privati-
za[ion ofPolish state enterprises, but a large number
of new companies were set up by Polish entrepre-
Table 1: Targrts and Outturns, 1990.
Target 90 Realiz:tuon 90
Intlauon
0.c. 1990 over Dec. 19ë9 (~) 95 250
Kesl wages (9r) - I p -2g
Pnvate consumption t'kJ -6 -24
Industrirl production by statr
enterprixs (~Xc) -5 -25
Gross domestic product 1`k) -5 - I 2






(billions of U.S. dollars) -p,g -3.8
Source: BIESSENBOS-KARCZEWSKA (1991).
I neurs. Table 1 shuws a number of macroecunomic
targets of this stabilization progratn tbr 199U and
their realized values.
The most striking aspect of the table is the extremely
large gap between the targets for the Polish economy
in 1990 and the outtum. Even though the authorities
were successful in maintaining a tixed exchange
rate throughout the year, the realized average rate of
intlation deviated very substantially from the fore-
cast, and so did the outcomes for consutnption,
wages, production, foreign trade and unemploy-
ment. Perhaps the numbers for the govertmient budget
form an exception; the forecast - a def-icit - had the
wrong sign because a surplus was realized in the
govemment's budget, but both forecast and realiza-
tion are relatively small numbers given the size of
the Polish economy.
Such great uncertainty raises doubts about the ap-
propriateness of tixing the exchange rate for a long
period. In fac[, continued high inflation into 1991
has con[ributed to a dispute within the Polish gov-
emment abvut near tenn exchange rate pvlicy, with
the Polish Planning Bureau, for example, advoca-
ting a devaluation of the Zloty, even though this
would involve a deviation from the stabilization
policy agreed with the IMF.
Such uncertainty about a possible imminent de-
valuation increases the risk premium in domestic
interest rates. Because the extent of a possible de-
valualion will be large, the risk premium which is
directly related to the produc[ vf the pvssible de-
valuation and its probability, will alsv be substan-
tial. There are other costs assvc;iat~d with great un-
certainty about a possible large discrcte muve in the
nominal exchange rate. First, if domestic money
market and savings rates are nut yet fully markrt-
detemiitte,d, substiwtion by residents ol' foreign molky
for dumestic money is itselt a major cause of du-
mcstic inFlation, bCCauSC llle dCln7n~l IUr dOmCSIIC
money falls whilst its supply isnot reduced. Second,
further liberation of international payments may be
suspended in an attempt to artiticially increase the
demand for domeslic money. Finally, and must
important, fixing the nominal exchange rate whilst
experiencing domestic inflation greatly in cxcess uf
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foreign in(lation implics strong real appreciation of
the domestic currency. As is well known from in-
stances of real appreciation in the middle-income
countries ofLatin America, strong real appreciation
mcans that the composition of imports shifts from
impcirts of investment goocis to imports of consumer
goocls, whilst exports suffer from a lack of interna-
tional competitiveness. Importers andconsumers of
foreign produced luxury goods exert political pres-
sure to maintai~ the fixed exchange rate, but each
additional month of further real appreciation leads
to more serious distortions in relative prices and
makes it harder for the country to trade internation-
ally according to its comparative advantage.
Very disappointing so far has been the experience
with privatization in Poland. On July 13th 1990 the
Polish parliament passed a law on privatization
which stipulated that 20 perzent of the shares in lazge
privatized state companies should be reserved for
the workcrs. The then Polish govemment was in
favor ofspreading ownership of the remaining 80010
as widely as possible overthe population. However,
so far only 8 industrial corporations have been
privatized. Difficulties in valuing the assets and
liabilities of corporations, the lack of capital mar-
kets, and the paucity of domestic savings have been
cited as explanations for the lack of success in
privatizing the larger enterprises.
More fundamental causes, however, may be found
outside of the financial sector. With sharply in-
creasing nationwide unemployment, the workers as
represented by the unions may be less than keen on
privatízation of their own company, reckoning that
new management will try to increase labor produc-
tivity by cutting employment and selling of those
no-core businesses that used to be part of the enter-
prise - given the strong tendency towards vertical
integration under communist rule - but have no
place in a more efficient, private company. Also,
both workers and management will try to negotiate
with the authorities about the conditions of privat-
ization, in particular about forgiving company debt.
Finally, a number of ohservers of the Polish econo-
my have pointed out that the transitional phase with
its unclear demarcation of property rights in the
E. 1. BnmhofE Privatization
enterprise may suit current management, since the
managers have continued tenure as state employees
but may at the same time engage in deals involving
domestic start-up companies or foreign joint ven-
tures without much control by owners' representa-
tives. According to LIPTON and SACHS (1990):
"managers quickly discovered ways to appropriate
state property by making sweetheart deals with an
outside partner in a process that quickly became
known as "spontaneous privatization." Lewan-
doski and Szomburg call the process "legal par-
asitism."...While the govemment's oversight of joint
ventures has been strengthened, there is anecdotal
evidence to suggest that at least some joint venture
arrangements still serve the self-interest of manag-
ers. Also, while new conflict-of-interest laws have
been put in place to prohibit spontaneous privatiza-
tions through sweetheart deals, the effectiveness of
these regulations is not yet clear" (pp. 306-307).
These experiences have contributed to a change of
sentiment in Poland regarding privatization of the
larger enterprises. It is now more generally recog-
nized that giving a stake in the enterprise to the
workers may make sense as a political concession,
but should remain limited for two fundamental rea-
sons. First, the well known argument that workers
whose future income is tied up to some extent with
the fortunes of their company should not also invest
their wealth in sharcs of the same company. Diver-
sification of the workers' wealth calls for investment
in other directions. Second, as shown dramatically
by thc example ofYugoslavia, workerownership or
labor-managed firms are inefficient, because the
workers will try to maximize profits per worker or
capital per worker rather than total profits of the
enterprise. Hence, the workers will resist rational
proposals to expand the firm because it will dilute
the profitability of the cutrent stock of capita! per
worker. Also, the labor market becomes very inef-
ficient as olderworkers will require new entrants to
fund their pensions. Lipton and Sachs write: "From
an efficiency standpoint, it makes little sense for
workers to own their ownenterprises (or to lease the
capital in their enterprises), except in the case of
small, labor-intensive operations. Worker owner-
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ship or labor-management [ends to cut Finns out of
the capital markets. Outside investors often shun
enttrprises in which workers have a controlling
interest, since the workers can act opportunistically
to absorb all of the income of the firm in the form of
wage compensation" (LIPTON~SACHS 1990, pp.
309-31 I). These theore[ical analyses of labor-
managed fitTrts explain why in market economies a
limited number ofactivities are organized predomi-
nantly by labor-managed firtns: accountancy fitms,
architects, management consultants, sometimes sym-
phony orchestras, all examples of fitms where the
amount ofcapital per worker is low and most work-
ers are professionals whose productivity and pos-
sible promotions are more e:uily ntonitored by peers
than by standard managemen[ procedures. By con-
trast, labor-management is almost non-existent in
market economies outside these specific areas; in
p:uticular, it is very rare toobserve successful labor-
managed firms in sectors where a large amount uf
capital per worker is required and production work-
ers can be supervised by management using indica-
tors of output and productivity.
Fortunately, public opinion in Poland appears to
accept that the original objectives of substantial
worker ownership combined with widespread pop-
ular capitalism were inappropriate. There is agrow-
ing consensus that designing proper incentives for
management and workers is more imponant (see
section 3).
2.2 Legal chaos in the Soviet Uniun
The Soviet Union currently suffers from unresolved
urguments between central govemment and the
republics over who controls policy. With net mate-
rial productexpected to decline by I Solo this year on
top of an estimated 401o decline in 1990, the weak
centr,tl govemment will be unable lo close its budget
deficit. However, it is dependent for income on the
republics whrre the collection uf tax revenues has to
be organized. According to THE ECONOMIST
( I 99 I c 1 the republics have only cuntributed 40 per-
cent of what the central govemment reyuired them
to hand over in first three months of 1991. ln my
view, the battle over tax revenues and the authority
to impose and collect taxes isextremely debi I itating
for the Soviet Union at present and will need to be
resolved before there is any chance of attracting
voluntary private capital from ubroad.
A recent story in the THE WALL STREET 10UR-
NAL (1991a) illus[rates the current administrative
chaos in the Soviet Union by describing the lxiwer
vacuum in [he northerly city of Archangcl:
"For almost every new law issued by the Kremlin,
the Russian govemment has passed its own version
that amends or blucks the Suviet one. The dispulrs
leave provincial aflicials unceilain abuut which
laws, if any, lo follow."
"Without a union treaty, the war of laws will con-
tinue forever," says Sergei Semyonov, an aide to an
Archangel deputy in the Russian parliament. "W hat
we need is stability. Unfortunately, th~re's more
noise than rcason in our politics."
"Archangel politicians blame some of their diflï-
culties on the cwnbersome systemof lucal adminis-
tr.ttion that Mr. Gorbachev h:u crcated. The town, :ui
ancient White Sea port built up by Peter the Great, is
relatively small, with a population of400,1)D0. Even
so, six separate bodies all have a say in governing it:
A regional council oversees the whule Archangel
area, which is geographically bigger than France.
The regional council's responsibilities overlap, to
some extent, with those of the Arrhangcl Town
Council and of fourseparate district councils. Over-
all, mure than 6W deputies are in these bodies. A
hierarchy ofsorts does exist, with the regiunal body
suppusedly more powerlul than the Town Council,
which in tum has more authority than lhe district
organizations. But the system uften breaks down."
"Those responsible for passing legislation Jon't
have the authority to implement it, while thuse
charged with implementing dccisions don't have
the authoriry to implement it, while those chargcd
with implementing d~cisions Jun't bear respun~i-
bility for making them. "The structure oC power is
all wrong", complains Alexandcr Drikcr, a d~puty
in the Town Council. The price of tr.un Iick~ts is a
case in point. The town's traftspuit system is running
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at a big loss because in January the national govem-
mcnt jackcd up thc wholcsalc pricc of elcctricity.
The town is supposect to pay the difference but
docsn't havc thc moncy. It also can't raize tickct
prices, hecause Ihat falls under the jurisdiction of the
regionat council, which hasn't yet consented. Faced
with a drain on the town's coffers, the executive
rommince insisted on action. But after two days of
debate in the town assembly last month, deputies
refused to sanction price increases; they said only
thc regional council could do so. Taking matters into
its own hands, thc executive committce decided to
triple tram priccs anyway on April I."
"The Kremlin h:ts greatly increased prices of many
goods and servires bought by the town. Facing a big
deficit, the council has looked for new sources of
finance. It unilaterally sct new tax rates on all facto-
ries on its tercitory - and immediately ran into a
roadblock. Local banks handling all the accounts
refused to transfer the new higher amounts to the
town, saying Moscow hadn't authorizect thcm to do
so. Officials have liad no more luck with another
ploy to raise revenue. They decided to levy a I Solo
tax on somc local indu.titrics over which they are
supposed to have jurisdiction. But the factories
replied with a curt nyet, and the order proved unen-
forceable. "Nobndy observes the I So~o tax", says
Sergei Zmyotny, a shipyard official. "My opinion is
that the council doesn't have real power at the
moment."
Bcfcre the current attempts at refotTrt, the Soviet
Union did nol have a proper system of taxation. The
Ministry of Fin:tnce decided for each branch of
industry or cven down to the level of individual
enterprises how much tax was due; there was no
common tariff. ln August 19R6 the new law on joint
ventures with foreigners stipulated a 20~o tax on
profits. The Soviet govetnment intended to also
legislate a uniform profits tax for domestic enter-
prises, but this was never implemented. Currently
new forms of taxation can be imposed by presiden-
tial degree, but the individual republics are busy
drawing up their own tax laws.
Local tax inspectors oflen are faced with two con-
trary tax laws and feel forccd to make ad-hoc deci-
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sions. Soviet tax officials also still are accusromed to
ordering a company's bank to pay the tax as they
have assessed it. In sum, power still rests with
officials, and there is noclear rule of law in the area
of taxation. Until the lines ofdemarcation between
the center and the republics have been clearly drawn,
it seems unlikely that the current legal chaos in the
Soviet Union will subside. In the mean time, legal
uncertainty will spread from the area of taxation to
pricing policies for electricity, gas, water and other
state-provided goods and services. Units of gov-
emment that are faced with hud~et deficits mav trv
to compensate by raising prices of goods and ser-
vices that are produced under theircontroL as exem-
plifiedbythecitycouncil in the Archangel storythat
tripled the price of tram tickets.
Pervasive legal uncertainty regarding the tax system
and uncertainty ahout future prices for such essential
inputs in production as electricity, and public trans-
port, are severe handicaps for private enterprise. One
has to fear Ihat a low exchange rate that makes latxir
cheap by intemational standards cannot compensate
for such fundamental business uncertainties.
2.3 Uncertain property rights in East-Germany
One should be careful when trying to generalize
from experience in East Germany to the other for-
merlv socialist countries in Central and Eastem
Europe. For, East GetTrtany differed in two funda-
mental aspects from the other nations: first, its citi-
zens had the constitutional right to establish them-
selves in the Federal Republic of Germany and to
demand social services and housing upon arrival.
Once the Wall fell and this right became effective
hundrcds of thousands of East German citizens
voted with their feet and went West. The citizens of
the other formerly socialist countries arc not entitled
to automatic establishment in Westem Europe, un-
less they apply for the uncertain status of political
eefugees. Second, the Gertnan govemment imposed
the West-German DM as the sole legal currency in
East Gertnanyon luly 1 st. 1990. hence establishing
a fixed exchange rate between East and West Ger-
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many. Theonly remaining way in whichenterprises
in East Germany can become competitive intema-
tiortally by changes in a nominal magnitude is through
decreases in the nominal wage in East Getmany or
by wage subsidies financed by West-German tax
payers. In the other fotmerly socialist economies,
business can become more competitive if [he ex-
change rate of the domestic currency is devalued or
left free to float downwards on the foreign exchange
markets.
Nevertheless, recent events in East Germany con-
tain one importan[ lesson for the other ex-socialist
nations. The '~reuhand" was established to orga-
nize the privatizationof the large East-Get~rtan state
enterprises. It was faced with a double dilemma:
should state enterprises be offered for sale assoon as
possible or first be reorganized? Also, was it appro-
priate to offer enterprises for sale when potential
legal issues regarding compensation of fortner prop-
erty owners had not yet been settled'? The first of
these dilemmas was basically up to the management
of Treuhand to decide; the second issue depended on
decisions by the Gertnan parliament regarding
compensation of owners of property that was con-
fiscated by the East German state.
Ini[ially, sales were delayed because there was a
preference for reorganization before putting the state
conglomerates on the market and second, because
the German govetnment was inclined to solve the
compensation issue before allowing private sales of
en[erprises and the land on which they were estab-
lished. In March of 1991, however, the new eco-
nomics minister in Germany won an argument in-
side the German govetnment over the respective
priorities of settling compensation issues connected
to past forced nationalization and im~nediate sales of
state enterprises. !t has now been decided that new
investors will obtain the right [o continue doing
business on disputed property, with issues of com-
pensation to former owners being settled later and
separa[ely. Solution of [he first dilemma, reorgani-
zation before sale,or sale tirst and reorganization by
the new owners isobviously related to serious labor
market issues in East Germany. When the two eco-
nomies of Westem East Gertnany merged on July
lst, 1990, wages in East Gerniany were lixed at
about a third of their level in Westem Germany,
according to THE ECONOMIST (1991b) roughly
in line with relative levels of labor productivity.
However, since then wages have risen by over SOo~o
in many industries in the East, in order to prevent
workers from exercising theirconstitutional right to
emigrate from East to West. These very substantial
wage rises have not been matched by productivity
gains, so that the competitive pusitiun of the East
German finns has deteriorated sharply. This course
of events dces not imply criticism of last year's
decision to impose the West German Mark on the
East German Laender and to use a one-to-one ratio
in converting wages from Ostmark tu DM, because
the pressure to eyualize wage levels in East mid West
in order to prevent mass emigration would have
existed under any exchange rate arrangement. The
need for very large subsidies on wage costs would
have arisen in any event, but unfortunately it has
been more convenient so far to pay workers to
remain attached to their current enterprises than to
subsidize entrepreneurs who are prepared tu risk
setting up new firms or taking overexisting compa-
nies. But, keeping a large part of the labur force on
"short-time work" induces workers to take a wait-
and-see attitude instead of inducing them to active-
ly search for better oppor[unities" (NEUMANN
1991, pp. 22-23).
As in the caseof bankruptcies in market economies,
asset sales to a new owner, if necessary combined
with wiping out (part of the) existing debts, is more
eftïcient frum a social puint uf view than continued
operation under previous management with subsi-
dies by the State. For, as NEUMANN (1991) notes
"(i) the private investor has the strongest incentive
to raise the value of the company by apprupriate
reconstruction and bycontributing new capi[al, and
(ii) he is likely tohave the more intimate knowledge
and expertise with respect to chuosing a promísing
product ntix and marketing." (p. 22)
It never made much sense to pustpone privatization
until issues ofcompensation topreviuus owners had
been resolved and settled. For, the state owns all the
land and all the larger entetprises in East Gennany as
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wcll as virtually all of the housing stock. Hence, the
state will also be liable for any compensation Io be
paid to prcvious owners who were forced to rclin-
qui~h their propcrty to thc previous socialist state.
With the state both the current owner and responsi-
ble for compensation, there are obvious social gains
and no social losses if property is put to more
cfficient use as soon as possible through asset sales
to new private investors. Not to separate issues of
future ownership from issues of compensation to
former owners was a serious error which has con-
tributed to the disappointingly slow pace of privat-
ization in East Germany. The same principle would
appear to apply in the other formerly socialist econ-
omies of Central and Eastem Europe. The most
urgent task is to make the economy more efficient
through privatization and private ownership. This
will broaden the future tax base and put govemment
in a better position to eventually pay damages to
owners whose property was confiscated in the past
and who are deserving of compensation.
3. Privatization with the Proper incentives
All formerly socialist countries in Central and East-
em Europe wish to privatize most of their large
state-owned enterprises. Private ownership will lead
to moreefficient production and better use of labor,
capital and energy. Also, state ownership has often
been shown to be incapable of dynamic efficiency,
with a state-owned bus factory in Czechoslovakia,
for example, continuing to produce its price-win-
ning bus model for thirty consecutive years. Finally,
economic integralion of the formerly socialist na-
tions with the world economy requires realistic
prices which in tum means abolishing most state
subsidies to industry. Privatization can be regarded
as a means to make proper relative prices and an
industrial sector without heavy subsidization more
likely politically.
Both in Poland and in Czechoslovakia the debate
about privatization initially focused on striving
towards a measure of popular capitalism. All adult
citizens were to obtain sharcs in a portfolio of large
industrial companies or vouchers giving the pur-
chaser the right to obtain such shares at some dis-
count from estimated market value. Presumably
public opinion felt strongly that nationalized com-
pany assets belonged to the nation as a whole. Also.
grave and warranted concems about environmental
problems may have pointed towards widespread
ownership of industrial assets, as an institutional
means to promote more careful husbandry of pre-
cious environmental resources and optimal popular
support for costly but more environmentally-con-
scious industrial policies.
The new Polish govemment of President Walesa has
shifted its privatization policies. Minister Janusz
Lewandowski for Ownership Changes wrote: "Too
much stress and energy was concentrated on public
offerings, to the disadvantage ofother methods that
are possible under the privatization law." (THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL 1991 b). According to
Minister Ltwandowski, the Polish government in-
tends tocontinue its attempts to achieve widespread
share ownership, but now is more keen than before
to identify a group of major stakeholders in the
company and toensure that these insiders act on the
proper incentives. More worked-out proposals are
to be found in the páper by Lipton and Sachs quoted
above. These authors rightly note that ifownership
ofenterprises is too much dispersed, the many indi-
vidual small owners will have little incentive to
monitor management. Hence, "the privatization
process should avoid creating an atomistic owner-
ship sttvcture for the large enterprises, in which
hundrcds of thousands or millions of owners each
retain a small number of shares. Most ownership of
the large enterprises should be held by intermediary
agents such as pension funds, mutual funds, or
commercial banks, or by large ownets with concen-
trated stakes" (LIPTON~SACHS 1990, p. 317).
Copying the French experience with privatization of
state owned enterprises in the 1980s, Lipton and
Sachs advocate the search for a groupofcore inves-
tors who own at least 20R'o of the shares. For instance,
management could take such a share in the compa-
ny, paying for the shares with borrowed funds.
Minister Lewandowski in his Wall Strcet Joumal
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anicle suggests that managers and~or workers could
pay fortheirsignificant share over a three to six year
period after the firm has been valued by an indepen-
dent consulting service. A significant ownership
stake for management if it has been obtrined with
borrowed funds would create much better incen-
tives for the managers to act in the company's best
interests than the current system in Poland which
tempts the managers to engage in joint ventures with
foreigners in which they have a private interest or to
search for other means to enrich themselves at
company expense. An essential element would be
that management does no[ obtain its share in the
company for free but indeed has to borrow exten-
sively in order to purchase the shares, possibly over
a multi-year period.
In this respect, a country like Bulgaria in which most
people own their homes has a very significant ad-
vantage over nations were private property is much
less imponant. In Bulgaria, one should ask manag-
ers tu take a mortgage on their homes and on any
other real estate they may own in order to purchase
their shares in the companies they manage. If the
company is successful, they will be able to pay back
the lo:ut out of future profits; if they fail the test of the
market or do not put their company's interests first,
they risk losíng their homes.
Additionally, a stake of similar size could be placed
privately with either a commercial bank or a pension
fund. An outside investor, such as a bank or a pen-
sion fund, which acquires a significant stake in the
company of 20010 or more, has a strong incentive to
spend resources monitoring management. Lipton
and Sachs write: "The Eastem European economies
should aim to develop universal banking, as in
Germany and Japan, where the commercial banks
hold stakes in corporate assets and play active roles
in the oversight of enterprises. The new banks should
place representatives on the corporate boards of
directors, and strengthen their capacities to panici-
pate in the restructurings of troubled firms. Of
course, yualitïed banks cannot be created at once,
bw it will be far easier to build up the operational
capacity of a dozen large banks (perhaps through
management contracts with foreign banks) than to
rely on the decentralized oversight uf thousands of
individual enterprises (LIPTON~SACHS 1990, pp.
318 and 319).
Proponents ofa corporate tinancial structure tbr the
privatized enterprises of Eastcrn Europe, that em-
phasizes a majur stake for m:rnagement paid for with
borrowed funds and anothcr substantial stake in the
hands ofaprofessionally managed financial institu-
tion, aim at creating the proper incentives. This is
partícularly important because the fornierly social-
ist countries lack developed tïnancial markets, a
sophisticated financial press :uid even an indigenous
accountancy profession that is familiar with mar-
ket-based systems of tïnancial accounting. There-
fore, the marketable assets of the firm shouW be
pledged to the bank or pension fund that has a
signiticant stake, so that this tinancial institution has
a reasonable chance of recovering the tLll value of
its investment even in the event of mcxlerately ad-
verse developmcnts. The managers should pledgc
their personal assets, so as to crcate the proper in-
centives against the growth of managerial pe:rks -
unnecessary foreign travel, blurring of the distinc-
tions between company property and private prop-
erty etc. - and to make sure that managers identify
their personal business interests with those uf the
company.
The proposal that management should bunow against
the value of its personal asscts - a home or rcal estate
- also applies in the case of s[art-up companics.
Robert HALL (1988) writes: "In every situation 1
know of involving a small business and a bank, the
bank extracts security interest in the homes and
otherassets of the managers, wliich isexactly in line
with this idea that Ihere should be a non contingrnt
pledge thal there tx no effect to the eyuity interest of
the bank whatsoever. That is, the bank should get its
value out no matter what happcns just as the rntr~-
preneurs get to keep the pruce~d, uf their succes;es.
In a s[an-up situation, thc inccntivc prubl~ms are
partieularly acute. If you look at the kind uta dcal a
venture capitalist (the wealthholder) should make
with the entrepreneurs, it has the fullowing charac-
ter: the venture capitalius should have a full liyui-
dation preference and the principals shuuld invest
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all of their personal wealth, including all available
house eyuity." (p. 75).
Hull makes a case in this paper for legislation that
prevents hostile takeovers of the company during
the period (3-6 years'?) in which managers are still
paying off the bank loans they needed to purchase
their share in the enterprise. He dces "not support
the general hostility of finance economists to mea-
sures that defend the corporation against hostile
takeovers. Those measures are part of the way the
managers are given effective ownership of the inter-
nal eyuity."
4. Macroeconomic Uncertainties
The experiences in Poland, the Soviet Union and
East Germany which were discussed in section 2
above also carry a number of macrceconomic im-
plications. ln Polanci, the now available numbers for
all of 1990 convincingly show that fixing the ex-
change rate for a long period does not deliver stable
domestic prices. Intlation in Poland as measured in
Zloty's amounted to 249 percent for the full year.
Monthly rates of inflation varied substantially but
were not yet during this period a source ofpressure
on the exchange rate, because of the developments
in the bala~nce of trade. In fact, during 1990 some
observcrs even fclt that a revaluation should be put
on the agenda as the trade balance moved into
consider.tble surplus (300-400 million dollars month-
ly) during the period March-Juiy. Monthly figures
for the balance of trade remained positive through
October, but then turned sharply negative with the
December number an unsustainable S00 million
dollar deficit.
Given the large Fluctuations in domestic prices and
real wages in Poland, it is not so clear whether the
tïxing of the exchange rcue contributed much to
stability during 1990, with one essential exception:
the surpluses on international trade allowed the
country to build up its foreign exchange reserves.
Being able to dispose of a meaningful stock of
imemational reserves will greatly increase thecred-
ibility and forecastability of future monetary policy.
If only because there are no substantial stocks of
domestic cutrency held outside the country, it makes
little sense at prcsent to advocate purcly floating
exchange rate for the forrnerly socialist nations. For,
if theirexchange rates are not fixed, there is likely to
be a"managed" float. In order to insulate the ez-
change rate somewhat over the short-term from the
latest balance ofpayments data, it will be helpful if
theauthorities have a stockof intemational reserves
to smooth short-term Flow demands for hard cur-
rencies. Note, that this suggestion dces not at all
imply squandering the intemational reserves on
interventions to maintain an overvalued exchange
rate, the fatal mistake often made in Latin America!
The Soviet experiences have shown the costs in
terms of greater uncertainty of a lack of intemational
reserves. According to THE ECONOMIST (1991a):
"As export revenues fall, increasingly desperate
measures have been needed to meet debt obliga-
tions: 40qo of Soviet firms' export eamings are taxed
to pay interest bills. Of the dollars they have left,
9096 must be paid into a special hard-currency fund
controlled jointly by the central government and the
republics. These measures have wrecked the attrac-
tions for local companies of intemational trade. Yet,
drastic as they are, they are still inadequate."
Some Eastem European countries expect substan-
tial credits from international organizations during
1991. [t would seem attractive to add such capital
inflows to the intemational reserves at the Central
Bank and set up either a managed float for the
exchange rate or a system ofvery frequent auctions
of foreign exchange where companies and individ-
uals could bid for hard currencies. Such a system
would seem to be preferable to directly allocating
scarce foreign exchange to business fitTns, because
this will unavoidably lead to a political bias in favor
of large established companies and effectively re-
duce the chances for new or smaller firms to obtaín
foreign exchange through official channels.
In my view (BOMHOFF 1990), the fixing of the
exchange rate of the Zloty in January 1990 has not
provided a nominal anchor to the Polish economy,
but rather has served Ihe useful purpose ofallowing
Poland to build up a stock of intetnational reserves
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which will not only enhance the credibility of its
future and nominal policies but alsocontribute to an
increase in business confidence. The nominal an-
chor has not been provided so far by :t fixed ex-
change rate; neither can it be derived fru~o a money
growth rule as, for instance, followed with success
by Getmany, because the domestic demand for
money is still too unstable. Elsewhere I have rec-
ommended using indicators of nominal wages as the
best available nominal gauge for the economy dur-
ing the difficult transitional period.
The importance of nominal stability however
strived for, is beyond doubt. A necessary condition
is sufficient credibility of the domestic money and
no more than a very modest role for foreign curren-
cies as medium of transactions between domestic
residents. [n Poland at the end of 1989 a full 73
percent of money held by households and private
enterprises consisted of foreign currency deposits
with only 27 percent consisting ofcurrency, demand
deposits or interest-bearing deposits in Zloty's.
Such a reduced role for the domestic cutrency sug-
gests incipient hyperinFlation, because any addition
to the circulation of domestic money through the
ptinting press will be an ever larger percentage of the
outstanding stock ofdomestic currency if residents
continue to substitute hard currencies for domestic
money. Experience in developed market economies
has shown that govemment revenues from sei-
gniorage can amount to 2-396 of gnp, but only if
there is no large-scale currency substitution by
domestic residents (DORNBUSCH 1988). There is
no way in which a govemment can finance 2-39fo of
gdp through the printing press without incurring a
hyperinflation if foreign currencies already are more
important than domestic cutrency in the economy.
In order to promote the role of the domestic curren-
cy, the Bulgarian Central Bank has recently decided
to terminate the practice ofselling luxury goods for
foreign currency only. In a very initial phase of
economic liberalization such special stores that only
accept foreign currency may make some sense as a
means to attract foreign currency out of the black
market into the open; once the decision has been
taken to move towards convertibility of the curren-
cy, the obvious aim of the monetary authoritics wil
be to strengthen the role of the domestic currency ii
all domestic transactions. In this penpective, th~
decision to abolish the hard-currency reyuiremen
for the purchase of luxury goods is sensible. Onl:
after the domestic currency has establ ished its dom
inant role in domestic transactions one can hope t~
achieve a situation in which the demand for domes
tic money stabilizes so that the authorities can hav~
more confidence in setting a path for the growth o
a domestic monetary aggregate.
Recent experience in the Soviet Union has showt
the debilitating effects of uncenainty about taxa
tion: which units of govemment are entitled to im
pose taxes? When such fundamental disputes arc no
resolved, central, regional or local units of govern
ment will resort to increases in the relative prices o
goods and services they supply in order to make ul
shortfalls in their budgets. Hence, the sudden in.
creases in prices of energy, public transport etc
which in part are symptoms ofunresolved conflict~
about taxation.
Uncertainty in the area of taxation will also make ii
more difficult to show both domestic residents anc
potential foreign investors that a definite break has
been made with the past as far as the style ofgov-
emment is concemed. It is crucial that the formerly
socialist nations show that decisions relating tc
individual citizens orcorporations are subject to the
rule of law and no longer depend on individual
negotiations as in the past. A market system reyuires
strict adherence to the rule of law in all areas relating
to business decision-making, since otherwise for-
ward planning becomes itnpossible and corruptiun
will not be reduced.
Promotion of the rule of law is also important for
more general reasons. Several observers have point-
ed out that citizens and corporations in Central and
Eastem Europe experience the need to rellect on the
morals appropriate to a market society. According to
the FINANCIALTIMES (1991): "Many Poles only
now understand the we nature of the corruption that
was an essential part of the communist system. The
authorities wanted people to cheat, lie and steal
because it allowed the possibility of locking up
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oublemakers on the basis of the ordinary criminal
ode, rather than for clearly political offenses. To-
ay there is growing recognition that the state is not
theirs" any more but "ours". However, when an
cquaintance went to the tax office in Warsaw to
eclare, for the first time, his foreign eamings, an
fficial asked him why on eanh he was bothering."
iovemment should set an example by showing that
ie rule of law govems commercial affairs and that
usinessmen do not need to negotiate with state
fficials about access to foreign exchange, their tax
abilities or any other issues with legal and financial
spects. A necessary (but notsufficient)condition is
clear tax .rystem that outlines the rights ofdifferent
nits ofgovemment to impose and collect taxes.
'inally, events in both Poland and East Getmany
ave clarified what commercial bankers can and
annot do. Commercial banks provide credit at a
ixed rate of interest implying that if the enterprise or
idividual to whom Ihey lend has greater-than-
xpected success, they do not share in such a favo-
nble outcome. Because of this limited "upside"
otential, banks can also not afford to suffer more
ian the occasional loss of principal. Hence, com-
iercial bankers will always reyuire collateral (se-
urity) to the full extent of their exposure. It there-
ore would be unrealistic to expect commercial
anks to provide finance on the basis of a business
dan drawn up under conditions of extreme uncer-
iinty regarding future movements of prices, wages,
omestic demand and the exchange rate, without
ffering the security of assets that have a likely
quidation value at least eyual to the credit pro-
ided.
{oth the privatization of state enterprises and the
tan of new companies therefore requires that man-
gement takes a significant stake in the company
nd offers its personal assets as collateral for the
urchase of shares. In a country like Bulgaria in
:hich rnany people own their homes, private resi-
ences can be pledged as collateral; otherwise
ianagers should accept that their wages over a 3-6
ear period would be reduced in order to pay for the
urchase of their share in the company. In case
omestic residents do not possess the wealth re-
quired to offer col lateral for the purchase ofcompa-
ny shares, government should consider rapid dena-
tionalization of the housing stock and of agricultural
land in order to provide its citizens with more col-
lateral. The realistic altemative would be to induce
foreign investors to pledge part of their wealth as
collateral for purchase of significant stakes in do-
mestic companies. Under all circumstances it would
appear unrealistic to aspect commercial banks to
provide credit for the purchase of shares in privat-
ized companies unless security up to the amount of
the loan is provided.
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